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Crying poor? The affordability of defence 
expenditure
by Mark Thomson
The next Defence White Paper will tell us how much money the government 
plans to spend on defence. But because the life cycle of defence assets 
routinely extends to three or four decades, the resulting plan will entail 
(explicit or otherwise) assumptions about defence expenditure decades 
hence. For this reason, the long-term ability of the economy to sustain the 
envisaged levels of defence expenditure needs to be confirmed. 
Conventional wisdom holds that Australia faces daunting fiscal pressures in 
the decades ahead due to its aging population and the rising cost of health 
care and other social services. The general argument appears in the 2003, 
2007 and 2010 Intergenerational Reports (IGR)1 produced by the Treasury 
and its potential implications for defence spending were outlined by the 
then Treasury Secretary in 20052. However, it’s argued below that IGR-style 
fiscal analyses are a poor basis—even on their own terms—for constraining 
defence spending. More importantly, it’s further argued that any analysis that 
focuses primarily on fiscal matters must, by its very nature, fail to address the 
more important question of making efficient use of taxpayer dollars.    
The fiscal argument
In its three successive intergenerational reports, the Treasury has combined 
long-term demographic and economic projections to estimate the federal 
government’s fiscal balance out 40 years—that is, the difference between 
projected Commonwealth revenues and expenditure. The specific results vary 
from version to version as a result of revised parameters and policy changes 
in the intervening periods. For present purposes, what matters are the broad 
results and overarching assumptions embedded in the approach. These are 
surveyed below in terms of the most recent IGR.
Like its predecessors, the 2010 IGR projected the cost of maintaining existing 
government policies for the subsequent forty years. Due to shifts in the 
demand for services (due to demographics) and real cost increases in some 
areas (particularly health), the 2010 IGR projected that federal expenditure 
will grow from 22.6 to 27.1% of GDP between 2014 and 2049 (the choice of 
2014 as base year allows the transitory effects of the Global Financial Crisis 
to be avoided). On the assumption that future federal governments maintain 
a tax-to-GDP ratio of 23.5% (the historical average since the introduction of 
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the GST), the 2010 IGR then calculated the projected fiscal gap each year between 
2009 and 2049. The result appears in Figure 1.   
Specific factors that are expected to drive the fiscal balance into deficit post-2030 
include a rise in health expenditure from 3.9 to 7.1% of GDP between 2014 
and 2049; a rise in aged care spending from 0.8 to 1.8%; a rise in payments to 
individuals from 6.5 to 6.9%; and a rise in education expenditure from 1.7 to 1.9%. 
In Treasury’s modelling, defence spending is assumed to remain around 2% 
of GDP. 
Whatever the causes, a prolonged period with a steadily rising fiscal deficit like 
that projected by the IGR is undesirable. Even though many of the additional costs 
associated with an aging population will eventual pass as the cohort dies away, 
the accumulated debt and ongoing interest payments will impose a burden on 
future taxpayers. The clear implication of the IGR analysis is that we should be 
exploring alternative policies to alleviate the projected fiscal imbalance. It is beyond 
the scope of this short paper to explore the full range of options for doing so, 
except to note that spending reductions, tax increases and microeconomic reform 
(to boost productivity and/or participation) all have the potential to play a part, as 
might a sovereign wealth fund to carry forward medium-term surpluses to cover 
long-term costs. 
Let us assume for the moment that, for whatever reason, the assumption of a fixed 
tax-to-GDP ratio represents sound policy. And let us further assume that options 
to enhance economic growth have been fully exhausted and yet a structural deficit 
remains. This would leave spending reductions as the only means available to 
restore fiscal balance. Faced with such a situation, defence spending would warrant 
special consideration; not because it is intrinsically more important than other 
areas of expenditure, but because it is one of the very few areas of spending which 
delivers something close to a public good. 
Public goods (such as national defence and fresh air) are by definition 
non-excludable; once they are provided, no one can be excluded from enjoying 
them. For this reason, they are unlikely to be provided by the private sector apart 
from through acts of social responsibility. To understand why this matters, consider 
what happens if the government cuts expenditure in one of the many areas where 
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Figure 1: Federal budget projections 2009–2049
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it provides private goods such as health or education to individuals. For every dollar 
withdrawn by the government, individuals will spend some of their own money to 
at least partially restore the level of service previously provided (with the added 
benefit of more discerning consumption and probably more efficient provision of 
those services). In contrast, every dollar withdrawn from defence results in exactly 
one dollar’s worth less defence because individuals are unable to purchase defence 
from private sources. 
Irrespective of the peculiarities of defence as a public good, the underlying 
assumption of a fixed tax-to-GDP ratio warrants attention. As it happens, Australia’s 
tax-to-GDP ratio including all levels of government (which is what matters 
economically) is low (27.1%) by international standards, ranking 28th out of 
33 OECD countries3. Moreover, many countries manage to maintain competitive 
economies and high standards of living with much higher levels, including Denmark 
(48.2%), Sweden (46.4%) and Finland (43.1%). Especially if we adopted reforms 
that made our tax system more efficient (i.e. reduced its excess burden), it would 
not be an economic catastrophe if taxes were to rise. In fact, in 1965 Australia’s 
tax-to-GDP ratio was just below 21% but has risen roughly in tandem with the 
growth of our economy since then4. 
Part of the explanation for the wide variation in tax-to-GDP ratios is that it depends 
on the demarcation between the public and private provision of services to 
individuals. Around the world, countries choose to draw the line between the public 
and private provision of services differently—not just in areas such as health and 
education, but also in terms of retirement income and aged care. The relative 
economic efficiency of the different arrangements depends as much on the details 
of implementation (including the regulatory schemes applied to private provision of 
services) as it does on the public-private demarcation. It makes no sense to pick a 
particular tax-to-GDP ratio and assign to it a privileged position. 
The reality is that future Australians will, on average, be much better off than we 
are today and therefore able to sustain public goods (such as defence) and social 
services (such as health and education) with relatively less acute opportunity costs 
to their own private consumption. This is true irrespective of the extent to which 
the latter are delivered by the government. The 2010 IGR estimated the future size 
of Australia’s economy by combining projections of population, participation rate 
and labour productivity out to the mid-century. Despite an anticipated fall in labour 
participation, expected strong population growth and steady productivity increases 
are projected to deliver an almost 3-fold increase in real GDP between 2009 and 
2049. In terms of per-capita—a rough measure of individual prosperity—the result 
is a 79% real increase from $59,986 in 2009 to $107,344 in 2049 (both figures are 
expressed in 2009–10 dollars). Curiously, the IGR is shy about revealing this good 
news, preferring instead to talk about economic growth in terms of average annual 
changes, with graphs of cumulative changes reserved for conveying the rise in 
the cost of social services. There is no doubt that, throughout the period covered 
by the IGR, Australians will be able to enjoy an expanded combination of private 
consumption, social services and public goods. We simply have to decide how we 
are going to take advantage of our prosperity. 
Even from a narrow fiscal perspective, Australia is better placed than almost any 
other developed economy to move into the decades ahead. We have very modest 
public debt by international standards, relatively more favourable demographics 
than any country apart from the United States, and we were early adopters of 
self-funded retirement thereby avoiding the massive unfunded pension liabilities 
that many other countries have. The faux fiscal crisis presented by the IGR is 
confected by fixing the tax-to-GDP ratio and downplaying the latitude to shift 
expenditure from public to private provision of private goods. 
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Of course, all other things being equal, it would be better to have lower levels of 
taxation than otherwise. Taxation distorts the efficient allocation of resources and 
reduces the total wealth available. In effect, each dollar taken by the government 
in taxation imposes a cost. So why do countries maintain tax-to-GDP ratios far 
in excess of that necessary for delivering public goods which, as we’ve seen, 
cannot practically be provided otherwise? It’s because they assess that there are 
benefits to be had which outweigh the costs. While it is undeniable that these 
benefits sometimes accrue to narrow vested interests of various sorts, it is also 
true that taxation (and the government spending it enables) often delivers widely 
dispersed benefits that are valued by society as a whole. And this brings us to the 
essential point about the ‘affordability’ of defence spending based around fiscal 
considerations; it misses the point entirely. 
It matters not at all whether spending on defence can be shoehorned within some 
arbitrarily chosen tax-to-GDP ratio. The proper question is whether spending on 
defence delivers greater benefit than the alternatives—be the alternatives better 
social services, greater private consumption through reduced taxation, or symphony 
orchestras on every street corner. 
The economic argument
In economic terms, the criterion for the efficient level of defence spending is as easy 
to state in principle as it is difficult to determine in practice. Spending on defence 
should be set to the point where the marginal benefits of additional spending 
equal the marginal costs, that is, the opportunity cost of using those resources for 
other purposes5. Or, in plain English, we should spend only so much on defence 
as delivers us a net benefit greater than the alternative uses of the money. Think 
of it this way; government spending amounts to a series of investments into such 
things as defence, education, health, arts and infrastructure. The goal should be 
to allocate resources across these competing alternatives so as to maximise the 
return on investment (i.e. to gain as much benefit as possible). Such an allocation is 
said to be efficient. 
This is not to suggest that fiscal considerations are irrelevant, they are not. Rather, 
factors such as the deadweight effect of taxation, and even the impost of servicing 
debt, are costs that need to be taken into account in assessing the benefits 
promised by defence expenditure. Provided that the benefits outweigh the costs, 
there is room for higher defence expenditure; equally, if the costs of current defence 
spending exceed the benefits, then defence spending should be cut.
Setting arbitrary boundaries on the allocation of resources—by, for example, 
adopting a fixed tax-to-GDP ratio—constrains the range of possible solutions to 
such a narrow set as to make it all but inevitable that a large number of more 
efficient allocations are excluded. Moreover, even were such an arbitrary boundary 
adopted, the underlying principle should be the same: defence spending should be 
increased if its marginal benefit exceeds it marginal cost (which now includes the 
foregone opportunity to spend that fixed volume of tax dollars on things other than 
defence) and only reduced if its benefits at the margin fall short of its costs6.
Equally, approaching defence expenditure as an entirely demand-driven exercise 
is unlikely to deliver an efficient outcome. It is sometimes argued that defence 
planning is a matter of determining what it takes militarily to defend Australia and its 
interests and passing the bill along to the taxpayer who then pays in full. Unless the 
benefits of defence clearly outweigh all possible alternative uses of the resources 
so allocated, the result will be inefficient. 
Sometimes, in the past at least, it has been a reasonable working assumption that 
the benefits of defence are sufficiently high for such an assumption to be accepted. 
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That’s why in 1942, at the height of WWII, Australia diverted 37% of its gross 
national expenditure into its military effort, severely restricting private investment 
and constraining private consumption7. But with the advent of nuclear weapons 
rendering a return to industrial-age total war so unlikely as to be safely ignored, 
defence expenditure must be set on the basis of a careful balancing of benefits 
and costs.
Reaching a judgment on the efficient level of defence spending for Australia given 
its present circumstances and outlook is a question for another day and a topic for 
a longer paper. Instead, we conclude with some overarching comments about the 
nature of the problem. 
The benefits of defence expenditure come in the form of avoiding possible future 
costs, either by reducing the likelihood of armed conflict through deterrence or by 
reducing the cost of conflict should it occur—armed conflicts impose costs on both 
sides with the vanquished typically (though not always) incurring a higher final cost. 
Thought about this way, the benefit of a given level of defence expenditure is the 
difference between the costs incurred with and without that level of spending. As 
a result, the question to be asked about defence spending is: would an additional 
dollar spent on defence save us more than a dollar in present value of added costs 
in future, taking account of risks? Given that indicative levels of defence spending 
are around 1.5 to 2.0% of GDP per annum (equivalent to roughly $22 to $30 billion) 
this is a demanding criterion. 
There is no good reason why the explicit likelihood and consequences cannot be 
estimated for the range of contingencies upon which defence plans are based. 
While such an approach would not enable the efficient level of defence spending 
to be ‘calculated’, it would impose a robust discipline on discussions about the 
costs and benefits of alternative roles (and consequent force structures) for 
the ADF and the net benefits that may or may not accrue as a result. What, for 
example, are the envisaged marginal benefits of an additional six submarines? 
In what sort of possible contingencies will the cost of six additional submarines 
be manifested in a reduced net cost, i.e. a benefit? What future costs, in terms of 
possible contingencies, are forestalled by maintaining eight rather than six infantry 
battalions? Are the forestalled costs greater or less than the cost of the additional 
two infantry battalions?  
To not ask these sorts of questions is to abandon the allocation of billions 
of dollars to the heuristic judgements of advisors with vested personal and 
institutional interests. 
Conclusion
Australia is and will remain a prosperous country. The absolute affordability of 
defence expenditure at the levels proposed by even the most hawkish advocates 
is not an issue. But prosperity is not an excuse for profligacy, each and every dollar 
allocated to defence should be justified on the basis of providing superior benefit to 
the available alternatives. 
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